Deductible or Co-Insurance: Which is the Better Insurance Contract under Adverse Selection? by Breuer, Michael
  
 
 
Socioeconomic Institute 
Sozialökonomisches Institut 
 
 
 
 
 
Working Paper No. 0401 
 
Deductible or Co-Insurance: 
Which is the Better Insurance Contract 
under Adverse Selection? 
 
Michael Breuer 
 
Update: October 2004  
 
 
 
  
Socioeconomic Institute 
University of Zurich 
 
Working Paper No. 0401 
Deductible or Co-Insurance:  
Which is the Better Insurance Contract under Adverse Selection? 
 
 
January  2004 
 
Author’s addresses Michael Breuer  
E-mail: mbreuer@soi.unizh.ch 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
  
  
 
 
 
Publisher Sozialökonomisches Institut 
Bibliothek (Working Paper) 
Rämistrasse 71 
CH-8006 Zürich 
Phone: +41-1-634 21 37 
Fax: +41-1-634 49 82 
URL: www.soi.unizh.ch 
E-mail: soilib@soi.unizh.ch 
 
    
Deductible or Co-Insurance: 
Which is the Better Insurance Contract  
under Adverse Selection? 
 
 
Michael Breuer* 
University of Zurich 
 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
The standard solution to adverse selection is the separating equilibrium introduced by 
Rothschild and Stiglitz. Usually, the Rothschild-Stiglitz argument is developed in a 
model that allows for two states of the world only. In this paper adverse selection is dis-
cussed for continuous loss distributions. This gives rise to the new problem of finding the 
proper form of an insurance contract to impose partial insurance of the low risks.  
This paper contributes to the discussion on optimal insurance. It analyzes two basic forms 
of insurance contracts: A contract with a deductible and a contract imposing a positive 
co-insurance rate. Since high risks can always self-reveal themselves as high risks and 
buy the optimal insurance contract at high risks’ premiums the Pareto-superior insurance 
contract is the one that leaves the low risks with higher expected utility while deterring 
high risks from joining the contract that is designed for low risks. The deductible contract 
turns out to be superior if premiums contain a sufficiently high loading.  
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1. Introduction 
Insurance economists have paid a lot of attention to adverse selection. Starting 
with the seminal contribution by Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976), adverse selection 
is now seen as one of the most severe problems of insurance markets under 
asymmetric information, causing welfare losses or even a complete breakdown of 
insurance markets. The notion of a separating equilibrium in competitive insur-
ance markets under asymmetric information, providing full insurance to the high 
risks while restricting the low risks to partial insurance, is well understood. Roths-
child and Stiglitz employ the Nash equilibrium concept to get their results. Other 
equilibrium concepts such as Wilson (1977) or Riley (1979) have come to differ-
ent results but have also contributed to our understanding of insurers’ behavior 
and how insurers are restricted in designing policies in private insurance markets 
under adverse selection. However, if there is perfect competition on the insurance 
market, the analysis by Rothschild and Stiglitz is still relevant.  
The Rothschild-Stiglitz argument is developed in a model that allows for two 
states of the world only (namely one state of loss occurrence and one state with no 
loss).1 Premiums in the Rothschild-Stiglitz do not contain a loading but are actu-
arially fair. However, in the light of the vast literature about optimal insurance 
tariffs for continuous loss distributions it is somewhat surprising that the literature 
remains silent about the adequate form of insurance contract to enforce this sepa-
rating equilibrium if loss distributions are continuous. Therefore, this paper ana-
lyzes adverse selection if loss distributions are continuous and premiums contain a 
linear loading. While the generalizations of the model’s participation constraints 
and incentive-compatibility constraints to continuous distributions of losses are 
straightforward, the agents are now confronted with a new decision parameter, 
namely the form of contract to impose partial insurance. This is not a trivial prob-
lem. In fact, insurers have to look for the form of contract that leaves the low risks 
with a level of expected utility as high as possible while discouraging high risks 
from opting for the contract tailored for the low risks.  
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The following analysis concentrates on two basic types of contracts: Full coverage 
of losses above a nonzero deductible on the one hand and co-insurance contracts, 
on the other hand. This allows to contrast the design of an insurance contract 
which is known to be optimal when premiums contain a linear loading (the de-
ductible contract) with another standard design of insurance contracts. Since high 
risks can always opt for full coverage in the Rothschild-Stiglitz model the insur-
ance contract that leaves the low risks with higher expected utility while deterring 
high risks from joining the contract that is designed for low risks is in fact Pareto-
superior. 
2. The model 
Let the insured population consist of two types of risks, high risks (  and low 
risks . Both risk types may suffer a loss of 
)h
)(l Lx ⋅ . The maximum loss is .L 2 The 
distribution of x  is described by the density functions  and . Expected 
losses are therefore  for i
)(xfh )x(fl
∫1
0
)( dxxfxL i lh,= . Low risks are assumed to be better 
risks in the sense of first order stochastic dominance (FOSD), that is  
(1) xxFdxxfdxxfxF h
x
h
x
ll ∀=≥= ∫∫ )~()()()~(
~
0
~
0
 ,  > for at least one x , 
with  representing the cumulative density functions. As usual in 
models of the Rothschild-Stiglitz type, utility functions U  (
lhixFi ,),( =
0>′U , 0<′′U ) and 
initial wealth  are the same for both risks. Without any insurance, high and low 
risk individuals obtain expected utility  and , respectively, defined as 
w
1,hEU 1,lEU
                                                                                                                                     
1  Berger and Cummins (1992) are an exception in this respect. In the second part of their paper they allow 
for continuous loss distributions and characterize high and low risks by mean preserving spreads. How-
ever, in such a model adverse selection problems only arise if insurers are not risk neutral. 
2  The maximum amount of the loss may well be as high as the individual’s wealth. Assuming a maximum 
loss therefore is not a very restrictive assumption. However, it will turn out to be extremely helpful for 
comparisons of the two types of contracts. 
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(2)  for dxxfxLwUEU ii ∫ −= 1
0
1, )()( lhi ,= .3  
Individuals are fully aware of their own risk type. 
Insurers, on the other hand, cannot identify an individual’s risk type. Acting in a 
competitive environment (and profits restricted to be non-positive) they rather 
have to rely on self-selection of insured to establish a sustainable separating equi-
librium, if there is one.4 An insurance contract is defined by a premium P  and an 
indemnity schedule I . The premiums are assumed to meet the non-profit-
constraint. While Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976) assume the premiums to be actu-
arially fair, that is they meet the expected value of the indemnity, premiums in 
this paper may contain a constant loading. Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976) have 
shown that under perfect competition the only possible equilibrium is a separating 
one, providing at most partial coverage for the low risks. Let the two contracts 
 and  for high and low risks be a separating equilibrium. Written 
formally in the most general form, insurers have to find a pair of insurance con-
tracts that maximize the low risks’ expected utility under the following restric-
tions: 
),( ** hh IP ),(
**
ll IP
(3)  for ( )∫ ≥+−−= 1
0
1,
** )()())(( iiiiii EUdxxfxLIxLxfPwUEU lhi ,=  
(4) . 
( )
( )∫
∫
+−−
≥+−−
1
0
**
1
0
**
)()())((
)()())((
dxxfxLIxLxfPwU
dxxfxLIxLxfPwU
hlll
hhhh
Condition  (3) is the participation constraint stating that for both types of risk the 
expected utility obtained from the insurance policy tailored for each of them must 
not be lower than the expected utility from remaining uninsured. The (only bind-
ing) incentive compatibility constraint on the other hand is given by (4): High 
risks must have an incentive to  reveal themselves as high risks and opt for the 
                                                 
3  The situation of no insurance coverage is labelled by the index 1 for reasons of compatibility to the later 
section: It is equivalent to a co-insurance rate or a deductible of 1. 
4  As in the original model by Rothschild and Stiglitz, there might be no stable separating equilibrium if the 
fraction of high risks in the entire insurance population is low. 
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contract tailored for them instead of enjoying the lower premiums of the low 
risks’ contract.  
However, until now nothing has been said about the indemnity schedule that is 
appropriate to reduce low risks’ insurance coverage. In what follows we concen-
trate on two basic forms of insurance tariffs, namely contracts showing a deducti-
ble and contracts with a constant co-insurance rate. High risks can always rely on 
getting their reservation level of expected utility  from optimal insurance 
at high risks’ premiums by choosing their optimal co-insurance rate or deductible. 
Low risks’ expected utility in equilibrium, on the other hand, is higher if one can 
find the form of insurance contract that minimizes the low risks’ loss in expected 
utility caused by the reduction of coverage that is necessary to push the high risks 
expected utility from buying the low risks’ contract down to . In fact, the 
better contract in this sense would be Pareto-superior. In what follows it will turn 
out that the optimal form of an insurance contract highly depends on the amount 
of the loading factor. However, it is useful to begin the analysis for the case of 
actuarially fair premiums that do not contain a loading.    
min,hEU
min,hEU
3. Actuarially fair premiums 
3.1 Insurance contracts with a constant co-insurance rate 
Let the insurance contract demand a co-insurance rate  of every loss, so that the 
coverage reduces to 
c
( c)−1  of every loss.5 Indemnity then is simply 
(5) ( )xLcIc −= 1  
and the actuarially fair premium is given by 
(6)  for hi( )∫
=
−=
1
0
, )(1
x
ici dxxfxLcP l,= . 
Differentiating (6) w.r.t  yields: c
                                                 
5  In the literature it is more common to label the replacement rate c and the co-insurance rate (1-c). The 
terminology used here will make it easier to compare the results of this section with findings on contracts 
of the deductible type, analyzed in section 3.2. 
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(7) ∫
=
−=∂
∂ 1
0
, )(
x
i
ci dxxfxL
c
P
  for lhi ,= . 
According to (7), the reduction of the premium due to a higher co-insurance rate 
is linear. If both risk types buy the contract tailored for them they obtain expected 
utility of 
(8)  for  idxxfxLcPwUEU i
x
cici )()(
1
0
,, ∫
=
−−= lh,= . 
Differentiating  (8) w.r.t.  and using (7) yields: c
(9) 0)()()(
1
0
1
0
,
, ≤


 −−−−−′=∂
∂ ∫∫
==
dxxfxLdxxfxLxLcPwU
c
EU
i
x
i
x
ci
ci
lhi ,
  
                                          for = . 
Differentiating (9) again w.r.t.  yields c
(10) 0)()()(
21
0
1
0
,2
,
2
<


 −−−−−′′=∂
∂ ∫∫
==
dxxfxLdxxfxLxLcPwU
c
EU
i
x
i
x
ci
ci , 
which proves that  is concave in c . At ciEU , 0=c , (9) can be rewritten as 
(11)  0)()()()(
1
0
1
0
,,
0
, =

 −′+−′−=∂
∂ ∫ ∫
= ==
dxdxxfxLPwUxfxLPwU
c
EU
x x
iciici
c
ci ; 
consequently,  has a maximum ciEU , 0=c  (see Mossin 1968). Furthermore, the 
function will decrease more rapidly as self-insurance rates get higher. 
However, if high risks opt for the low risks’ contract (paying premium ) they 
obtain expected utility of: 
clP ,
(12) . dxxfxLcPwUEUL hclch )()(
1
0
,, ∫ −−=
Observe that at  high risks can enjoy the same expected utility as low risks 
by buying the same insurance contract. Since insurers are not able to observe an 
individual’s risk they cannot prevent any high risk from doing so. Consequently a 
full insurance contract would result in a pooling of the risks and high risks would 
obtain expected utility that is higher than the expected utility they would enjoy 
0=c
   5 
 
 
with full insurance for actuarially fair premiums ( )chEU ,
chEU ,
. Since insurers do not 
receive premiums from the high risks that cover their expected losses, this form of 
pooling risks is, of course, not sustainable. However, it is the high risks’ threat to 
join the low risks’ contract that urges the insurer to offer only partial coverage for 
low risks. 
chEUL ,
)( −dxx

− xLdx
clEU ,
The obvious solution to this kind of asymmetric information problem is to offer 
contracts that combine low risks’ premiums with a positive co-insurance rate to 
discourage high risks from opting for the low risks’ contract and to let them buy 
full coverage in exchange to high risks’ premiums. In a separating equilibrium 
. Consequently, for actuarially fair premiums the co-insurance rate 
has to be high enough to push  down to at 
chch EUEUL ,, =
chEUL , 0=c
c
. Unfortunately, a 
higher co-insurance rate reduces the low risks expected utility too. The marginal 
effect of a higher co-insurance rate on low risks’ expected utility  can be ob-
tained by applying (9) for i . Differentiating  w.r.t.  on the other hand 
yields: 
clEU ,
l=
(13) 0)()(
1
0
1
0
,
, <


 −−−−′=∂
∂ ∫∫ dxxfxLfxLxLcPwUcEUL hlclch . 
At  (13) reads as  0=c
(14) 0)()()(
1
0
1
0
,
0
, <
 −−−′=∂
∂ ∫∫
=
dxxfxfxLPwU
c
EUL
hlcl
c
ch , 
so that the slope of the -curve at chEUL , 0=c
ch,
 is negative. Comparing (13) with 
(9) for i  furthermore reveals that  has more weight on high losses and 
correspondingly on higher marginal utilities than . Therefore, the marginal 
negative effect of a decrease of  on expected utility is unambiguously stronger 
for high risks holding the low risks’ policy than for low risks – irrespective of the 
level of c . Since both risk types enjoy the same expected utility at , high 
risks’ expected utility must always be lower than low risks’ expected utility if 
 and the difference between both expected utilities must increase monotoni-
cally with . Expected utility as a function of the co-insurance rate  for both 
risks will therefore look as illustrated in figure 1.  
l=
c
EUL
c
0=c
c
0>c
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The difference in the effect on both risk types is stronger the more risk averse in-
dividuals are and the more weight high risks’ density function has on higher 
losses compared to low risks’ density function. 
Figure 1: Expected utility as a function of co-insurance rate 
 
EU 
EUl,c
EUh,c
EUl,1 
EUh,1 
c 1 
3.2  Insurance contracts with a deductible 
Now, let the insurance contract prescribe a deductible  with  0D 1≤≤ D
L
. The 
variable  represents the deductible as a fraction of the maximum loss . This 
allows convenient comparisons between deductible and co-insurance contracts. 
By multiplication with the maximum loss ,  can easily be translated into a 
number giving the absolute deductible fixed in an insurance policy. Consequently, 
indemnity payments are 
D
L D
(15)  

>−
≤=
DxforDLxL
Dxfor
xID
0
)( .
The corresponding actuarially fair premiums for high and low risks are given by 
(16)   for ( ) dxxfDxLP
Dx
iDi ∫
=
−=
1
, )( lhi ,= . 
Differentiating (16) w.r.t.  yields: D
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(17) (∫
=
−−=−=∂
∂ 1, )(1)(
Dx
ii
Di DFLdxxLf
D
P )  for hi l,= . 
The premium reduction due to reducing the level of insurance therefore is not lin-
ear any more (as it was in the case of a co-insurance contract) but is highest at low 
deductibles and diminishing with higher . If both risk types opt for the contract 
tailored for them their expected utilities read as: 
D
(18)   ( ) ( ) ∫∫
==
⋅⋅−−+−−=
1
,
0
,, )()(
Dx
iDii
D
x
DiDi dxxfLDPwUdxxfxLPwUEU
for lhi ,= . 
In analogy to the previous section, differentiating (18) w.r.t.  and using (17) 
proves that under actuarially fair premiums both risk types would prefer a de-
ductible of zero that is for full insurance coverage:  
D
(19) 
( )
( ) ∫∫
∫ ∫
==
= =



 −−−⋅−−′
+


 −−−−′=∂
∂
11
,
0
1
,
,
)()(
)()(
Dx
i
Dx
idi
i
D
x Dx
iDi
Di
dxxfLdxxLfDLPwU
dxxfdxxLfxLPwU
D
EU
for . lhi ,=
Condition (19) is zero at  and 0=D 1=D  only. To see if we can expect a maxi-
mum at one of these two extreme points it is necessary to differentiate (19) once 
more w.r.t. .This yields at  D 0=D
(20) ( ) ( ) 0)()0()0( 1
0
,
0
,
0
2
,
2
=−′−−′=∂
∂ ∫∫
=== x
iidii
D
x
Di
D
Di dxxfLfPwUdxfLPwU
D
EU
 
and at : 1=D
(21) ( ) ( ) 0)1()(1
01
2
,
2
>⋅


 −′+−′−=∂
∂ ∫
==
i
x
i
D
Di LfLwUdxxfxLwU
D
EU
. 
Consequently, there is a minimum at 1=D . Since there are no other extreme 
points, we have a corner solution for the maximum of at DiEU , 0=D . 
If, however, high risks opt for the low risks’ contract they obtain expected utility 
of 
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(22) . ( ) ( ) dxxfDLPwUdxxfxLPwUEUL h
Dx
Dlh
D
x
DlDh )()(
1
,
0
,, ∫∫
==
−−+−−=
Again, at  the high risks can enjoy the same expected utility as the low risks 
simply by buying the same insurance contract.  
0=D
The marginal effect of an increasing deductible on  can be obtained by ap-
plying (15) and (19) for i . Rewriting yields: 
DlEU ,
l=
(23) 
( )
( )
( ) ( )
( ) ( )DLPwUDFL
dxxfxIxLPwUDFL
dxxfLDLPwU
dxxfdxxLfxIxLPwU
D
EU
Dll
lDDll
l
D
Dl
l
D
lDDl
Dl
−−′−
−+−−′−=
−⋅−−′
+


 −−+−−′=∂
∂
∫
∫
∫∫
,
1
0
,
1
,
11
0
,
,
)(1
)()()(1
)()(
)()()(
. 
The effect of a higher deductible on high risks opting for the low risks’ contract 
on the other hand can be obtained by differentiating (22) w.r.t.  and applying 
the same transformations: 
D
(24) 
( )
( )
( ) ( )
( ) ( )DLPwUDFL
dxxfxIxLPwUDFL
dxxfLDLPwU
dxxfdxxLfxIxLPwU
D
EUL
Dlh
hDDll
h
D
Dl
h
D
lDDl
Dh
−−′−
−+−−′−=
−⋅−−′
+


 −−+−−′=∂
∂
∫
∫
∫∫
,
1
0
,
1
,
11
0
,
,
)(1
)()()(1
)()(
)()()(
. 
Note that both, (23) and (24) have extreme points at 0=D  and 1=D  only. Fur-
thermore, differentiating (24) again w.r.t  gives D
(25) ( ) ( ) 0)1()1()(1
01
2
,
2
>−′+⋅−′−=∂
∂ ∫
==
h
x
lh
D
Dh LfLwULfdxxfxLwU
D
EUL
, 
because if , the low risks’ loss distribution would not dominate the 
high risks’ loss distribution in the sense of FOSD. Therefore  has a mini-
mum at , so that we have a corner maximum at 
)1()1( hl ff >
1=
DhEUL ,
D 0=D . 
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Since both risk types’ expected utilities have a maximum at 0=D  they must de-
crease at all 0 . Therefore, for , 1<< D 0>D 0, <∂∂ DEU Dl  and 
0, <∂∂ DEUL Dh , with a minimum somewhere between zero and one. Expected 
utility as a function of the deductible  for both risks therefore is first concave 
and then convex as  increases. 
D
D
Concentrating on the last transformations of equations (23) and (24) it is clear that 
their second terms must dominate the first terms, which restrain the negative mar-
ginal effect of an increasing  on expected utility. By assumption,  in (23) 
has less weight on higher losses and therefore on higher marginal utilities than 
 in (24), so that the integral in (24) exceeds its counterpart in (23) for risk 
averse individuals. The effect on the integral is the stronger the more weight the 
high risks’ density function has on high losses compared to the low risks’ density 
function. Furthermore, differences between both integrals are greater the more 
risk adverse individuals are. 
D )(xfl
)(xfh
Having a closer look at the second terms one finds that the marginal negative ef-
fect of a higher deductible for a certain ,  D 10 << D , is the stronger for high 
risks relative to low risks the more the values of the distribution functions  
and , , differ at this . Low and high risks’ expected utili-
ties as functions of the deductible  therefore highly depend on the loss distribu-
tion functions. They differ more distinctive for small losses and small deductibles 
if low risks‘ loss distribution function has not too much weight on low losses. 
)(DFl
)(DFh )()( DFDF hl ≥ D
D
To illustrate, figure 2 sketches high and low risks’ expected utility as function of 
.  D
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Figure 2: Expected utility as a function of deductible 
 
EU 
EUl,D 
EUl,1 
EUh,D 
EUh,1 
D1 
3.3 Which type of insurance policy is the better one under adverse selection if 
premiums are actuarially fair? 
The analysis in sections 2.1 and 2.2 has shown that expected utility as a function 
of the co-insurance rate c  is strictly concave for both risks. Expected utility as a 
function of a deductible  for both risks, on the other hand, is first concave and 
then convex as  increases. From this follows that the appropriate co-insurance 
rate to push high risks’ expected utility from buying the low risks’ contract down 
to  is always higher than the deductible (defined as proportion of the 
maximal loss ) that leaves the high risks at the same level of expected utility, as 
illustrated in figure 3. 
D
D
min,hEU
L
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Figure 3: Comparing deductible and co-insurance 
Dl
o
EU
EU 
EUl,c 
EUh,c EUl,D 
,
However, to 
levels of expe
pushing high 
high risks ge
 itself
butions: The m
ums differ and
min,hEU
Unfortunately
tions. Whethe
on the distrib
high risks can
differences be
therefore 
losses, a dedu
the other hand
losses, a co-in
EU
   
cl
o
EU ,
EUh,min 
EUh,D 
c, D1 
find the Pareto-superior insurance contract one has to compare the 
cted utility low risks can reach in both insurance schedules when 
risks’ expected utility down to  , the level of expected utility 
t from buying full insurance at high risks’ premiums. Note that 
 depends on the differences between high and low risks’ loss distri-
ore alike both distributions are the less high and low risks’ premi-
 the higher is .  
min,hEU
min,hEU
, it turns out that neither form of schedule is the best in all situa-
r low risks prefer a deductible to a co-insurance rate highly depends 
ution functions (  and ) and the level of expected utility 
 obtain from full insurance at high risks’ premiums, . E.g., if 
tween both risks’ loss distribution functions are not very large (and 
 is relatively high) and has not too much weight on small 
ctible may be the low risks’ first choice of insurance contract. If, on 
, low risks’ loss distribution function has almost all weight on small 
surance rate is more likely to be optimal.  
)(xFl )(xFh
)(xFl
min,hEU
min,h
 12
 
  
4. Premiums containing a loading 
The somewhat negative result obtained in section 3 changes if we allow premiums 
to contain a loading. More specifically, assume premiums to be actuarially fair 
times a constant loading of κ+1 , with κ  representing the loading factor. Under 
symmetric information the optimal insurance contract would now be a contract 
with a deductible as has been shown by Arrow (1971) and others.6 However, as 
will be shown below, this result holds unambiguously under adverse selection 
only if the loading factor exceeds a minimum amount up to a certain point. 
4.1 Insurance contracts with a constant co-insurance rate 
As in section 3.1 premiums depend on the co-insurance rate c , but now addition-
ally contain the loading ( )κ+1 : 
(26)    for hi( ) ( )∫
=
−+=
1
0
, )(11
x
ici dxxfxLcP κ l,= . 
From differentiating (26) w.r.t.  it is clear, that premiums still depend on c  in a 
linear way: 
c
(27)  ( ) ∫
=
+−=∂
∂ 1
0
, )(1
x
i
ci dxxfxL
c
P κ  for i lh,= . 
Since individuals’ utility function does not change, it is easy to obtain the in-
sured’s expected utility by inserting  (27) into (8).  Differentiating this new func-
tion w.r.t.  yields c
(28) ( ) dxxfxLdxxfxLxLcPwU
c
EU
i
x
i
x
ci
ci )()(1)(
1
0
1
0
,
, 


 −+−−′=∂
∂ ∫∫
==
κ
lhi ,
  
                                          for = , 
which is greater than zero at . Consequently, under symmetric information 
every insured gets a higher expected utility by deciding for a positive co-
insurance rate rather than a full insurance contract. It is interesting to observe that 
(28) can even be positive at  if 
0=c
1=c κ  is sufficiently high, indicating a corner so-
                                                 
6  See e.g. Raviv 1979 or Gollier and Schlesinger (1996). 
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lution at , since  is concave in c  as can be shown by differentiating 
(28) again w.r.t. c : 
1=c ciEU ,
( )κw( −′′
c
EUi
2
,
2
∂ =
κ
=c
(0 << c
                                                
(29) dxxfxLdxxfxLxLcPU i
x
i
x
ci
c )()(1)
21
0
1
0
, 


 −+−∂ ∫∫
==
 
                                          for . lhi ,=
For the case of asymmetric information this also implies that the high risks’ reser-
vation level of expected utility by revealing themselves as high risks and accept-
ing the higher premiums is not the one they obtain at 0=c , but the level they ob-
tain at their optimal (positive) level of . c
Unfortunately, without further assumptions on the utility function and the loss dis-
tributions no further statements about the optimal level of  for high and low 
risks can be made. Under symmetric information the optimal amount of c for high 
risks can well be higher or lower than the optimal amount of c for low risks. The 
optimal level of co-insurance does not even have to increase monotonically with a 
higher loading factor 
c
.7 However, as noted before, there is a level of κ that in-
duces individuals to buy no insurance coverage. Furthermore, since an increase of 
 reduces the transfers high risks receive from the low risks in form of subsidized 
premiums, low risks can always push the high risks down to their reservation 
level of expected utility by choosing an adequate level of , which might be 
. 
c
c
c
1=
Let cκ(  be the minimum value of κ  that leads the low risks to choose the corner 
solution at , which means no insurance protection at all. High risks who buy 
the insurance contract tailored for the low risks, on the other hand, could still opt 
for partial insurance  at a loading of 
1
)1 cκ(+1 , in particular as long as their 
premiums are subsidized by the low risks. Consequently, cκ(  is the critical value 
for a separating equilibrium in a co-insurance contract that allows the low risks to 
obtain at least partial insurance protection. If cκκ (≥  low risks opt out and do not 
 
7  On the one hand, an increase of the loading factor makes insurance coverage more expensive. On the other 
hand it reduces the insured’s wealth and thereby increases their risk aversion if utility functions show de-
creasing absolute rate of risk aversion (DARA).  See Eeckhoudt and Gollier (1995, chapter 10) for this ar-
gument. 
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buy any insurance, irrespective of the existence of high risks and informational 
asymmetries. Insurers, on the other hand, then can be sure that their insured are 
high risks and adjust their premium and the co-insurance rate appropriately.  
4.2 Insurance contracts with a deductible 
By introducing a constant loading the premium function (16) changes to 
(30)    for ( ) ( ) dxxfDxLP
Dx
iDi ∫
=
−+=
1
, )(1 κ lhi ,= . 
Inserting the new premium function into the expected utility function (17) and 
differentiating w.r.t.  gives D
(31)  
( )( )
( ) ( ) ∫∫
∫
=
=
= ⋅









 −+⋅−−′
+⋅+−−′
=∂
∂ 1
1
,
0
,
, )(
1)(1
)(1
Dx
i
Dx
idi
i
D
x
Di
Di dxxfL
dxxfDLPwU
dxxfxLPwU
D
EU
κ
κ
l,
 
     for hi = . 
Note that the loading changes one of the extreme points of (19): While (19) and 
(31) both have extreme points at , it is true that1=D 0, >∂
∂
D
EU Di  at 0=D  for any 
positive κ . As expected, full insurance coverage is not optimal any more when 
premiums are not actuarially fair. However, from the FOC (31) it is not clear if 
there are any other extreme point between 0=D  and 1=D  and if these extreme 
points are maxima. To tackle these questions, (31) is differentiated once more 
w.r.t. : D
(32) 
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     for hli ,= . 
As has already been noted by Mossin (1968), (32) is negative, if the first deriva-
tive (31) is positive or zero.8 Consequently, depending on the amount of the load-
ing factor κ ,   has a maximum at some  between DiEU , D 0=D  and  or 
increases monotonically within this range, in which case it is maximized at the 
corner solution . Call the loading factor at which the low risks do not buy a 
deductible contract any more 
1=D
1=D
Dκ( . 
Again, high risks’ reservation level of expected utility they can get from accepting 
the higher premiums is not the one they obtain at 0=D , but the one they obtain 
at their optimal (positive) level of . Moreover, the optimal level of  does not 
necessarily increase with 
D D
κ .9 However, it remains true that low risks can always 
push the high risks down to their reservation level of expected utility by increas-
ing  and thereby reducing their transfers to the high risks. High risks could still 
wish to buy the low risks’ deductible contract at a loading factor of 
D
Dκκ (≥ , in 
which case insurers can be sure about their insured’s type and adjust the premi-
ums and the deductible appropriately.  
4.3 Which type of insurance policy is the better one under adverse selection if 
premiums include a loading? 
The results derived in section 4 so far do not look encouraging: For any loading 
factor κ  below cκ(  or Dκ(  , the amounts of loading that induce low risks to buy no 
insurance if the insurance contract is of the co-insurance of deductible type, re-
spectively,  no general conclusions about the superiority or inferiority of either 
type of contract can be derived. Loading factors above cκ(  or Dκ(  , on the other 
hand, lead the low risks to abstain from buying a positive amount of insurance in 
at least on of the two contracts. 
However, one standard result from the literature on optimal insurance policies is 
that an insurance contract prescribing a deductible is superior to other designs of 
                                                 
8  The first derivative is zero or positive iff the terms in parentheses of (30) or (31) are zero or positive. In 
(31) these terms are multiplied by a negative term while the other terms in (31) are always negative.    
9  Footnote 7 applies. 
  16 
 
  
insurance contracts when the loading is linear. This includes that cD κκ (( ≥ , be-
cause otherwise there would be an amount of loading leading to partial insurance 
in a co-insurance contract and to no insurance in a deductible contract. Due to risk 
averseness of the individuals this would contradict the claim that the deductible 
contract is the optimal design of an insurance contract. 
Consequently, we have to distinguish between three levels of the loading: If the 
loading factor is cκκ (≤≤0 , the results of section 3 apply and it is not possible to 
derive any general conclusions about the superiority or inferiority of either type of 
contract without additional information about the loss distributions. If Dc κκκ (( ≤≤  
the deductible contract (weakly) dominates the co-insurance contract, since the 
former might allow the low risks to get at least a partial insurance in a separating 
equilibrium while the latter leaves the low risks with no insurance protection at 
all. If, finally, κκ ≤D(  low risks will not buy any positive amount of insurance. In 
this situation, any individual that buys insurance protection can be assumed to be 
of the high-risk type; the problem of asymmetric information ceases and the mar-
ket equilibrium is efficient. Of course, the loading can be so high that even high 
risks abstain from buying insurance protection, in which case the insurance mar-
ket (efficiently) breaks down completely.  
5. Conclusion 
Generalizing the Rothschild-Stiglitz model by allowing for continuous distribu-
tions of losses does not change its principal result: The only possible sustainable 
equilibrium is a separating contract. High risks get full insurance while low risks 
are restricted to partial coverage to discourage high risks from buying the low 
risks’ contract. However, the new question arising is, which kind of insurance 
contract is desirable to impose partial coverage: a contract showing a deductible 
or a contract with a constant co-insurance rate. The analysis has shown that both 
forms of contract may be favourable under certain circumstances, highly depend-
ing on the premiums’ loading factor. If the loading factor is zero or sufficiently 
small, no general statement about the Pareto-superiority of either of the two forms 
of insurance contracts can be made without further information about both risks’ 
loss distributions. A co-insurance contract, which is inferior under symmetric in-
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formation and a linear loading might dominate a deductible contract. For higher 
but not too high loading factors, however, the deductible contract is unambigu-
ously Pareto-superior since low risks would give up insurance protection com-
pletely if provided by a co-insurance contract. Finally, for extremely high co-
insurance rates, both risk types do not buy insurance protection any more and the 
insurance market breaks down completely.     
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